## Off

#### The affirmatives strategy of development is rooted in racist assumptions of the “developing world”---economic engagement with Mexico is always predicated on the Western agenda

Grosfoguel 2K (Ramon, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of California Berkeley, “Developmentalism, Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America”, Nepantla: Views from South, Vol. 1 Iss. 2, p. 347-374)

Developmentalism became a global ideology of the capitalist world-economy. In the Latin American periphery these ideas were appropriated in the late eighteenth century by the Spanish Creole elites, who adapted them to their own agenda. Since most of the elites were linked to, or part of, the agrarian landowner class, which produced goods through coerced forms of labor to sell for a profit in the world market, they were very eclectic in their selection of which Enlightenment ideas they wished to utilize. Free trade and national sovereignty were ideas they defended as part of their struggle against the Spanish colonial monopoly of trade. However, for racial and class reasons, the modern ideas about individual freedom, rights of man, and equality were underplayed. There were no major social transformations of Latin American societies after the inde- pendence revolutions of the first half of the nineteenth century. The Creole elites left untouched the colonial noncapitalist forms of coerced labor as well as the racial/ethnic hierarchies. White Creole elites maintained after independence a racial hierarchy where Indians, blacks, mestizos, mulattoes and other racially oppressed groups were located at the bottom. This is what Aníbal Quijano (1993) calls “coloniality of power.” During the nineteenth century, Great Britain had become the new core power and the new model of civilization. The Latin American Creole elites established a discursive opposition between Spain’s “backwardness, obscurantism and feudalism” and Great Britain’s “advanced, civilized and modern” nation. Leopoldo Zea, paraphrasing José Enrique Rodó, called this the new “northernmania” (nordomanía), that is, the attempt by Creole elites to see new “models” in the North that would stimulate develop- ment while in turn developing new forms of colonialism (Zea 1986, 16–17). The subsequent nineteenth-century characterization by the Creole elites of Latin America as “feudal” or in a backward “stage” served to justify Latin American subordination to the new masters from the North and is part of what I call “feudalmania,” which would continue throughout the twentieth century. Feudalmania was a device of “temporal distancing” (Fabian 1983) to produce a knowledge that denied coevalness between Latin America and the so-called advanced European countries. The denial of coevalness created a double ideological mechanism. First, it concealed European responsibil- ity in the exploitation of the Latin American periphery. By not sharing the same historical time and existing in different geographical spaces, each region’s destiny was conceived as unrelated to each other region’s. Second, living different temporalities, where Europe was said to be at a more advanced stage of development than Latin America, reproduced a notion of European superiority. Thus Europe was the “model” to imitate and the developmentalist goal was to “catch up.” This is expressed in the dichotomy civilization/barbarism seen in figures such as Domingo Faustino Sarmiento in Argentina. The use of both neomercantilist and liberal economic ideas enabled the nineteenth-century Iberoamerican elites to oscillate between protectionist and free-trade positions depending on the fluctuations of the world economy. When they were benefiting from producing agrarian or mining exports in the international division of labor dominated at the time by British imperialism, liberal economic theories provided them with the rational justification for their role and goals. But when foreign competition or a world economic crisis was affecting their exports to the world market, they shifted production toward the internal markets and employed neomercantilist arguments to justify protectionist policies. In Chile, Argentina, and Mexico there were neomercantilist and economic nationalist arguments that anticipated many of the arguments developed one hundred years later by the Prebisch-CEPAL school1 and by some of the dependentis- tas (Potasch 1959; Frank 1970; Chiaramonte 1971). For example, the 1870s developmentalist debate was the most important economic debate in Ar- gentina during the nineteenth century and one of the most important in Latin America. An industrial development plan using protectionist neomercantilist policies was proposed. This movement was led by a profes- sor of political economy at the University of Buenos Aires and member of the Cámara de Diputados, Vicente F. López. López’s group was supported by the agrarian landowners, artisans, peasants, and incipient industrial cap- italists. Although all of them were protectionists, not all were economic nationalists. The protectionist position of the agrarian landowners was due to the 1866 and 1873 world economic crises, which had negatively affected export prices on wool, Argentina’s major export item at the time. Thus López promoted the development of a national cloth industry as a tran- sitional solution to the world depression. The movement ended once the wool producers shifted to cattle raising and meat exports. However, the group of deputies led by López developed neomer- cantilist and economic nationalist arguments that anticipated many of the arguments developed one hundred years later by the Prebisch-CEPAL school and by some of the dependentistas. Influenced by the late 1830s Argen- tinean romantic generation (e.g., Juan Bautista Alberdi, Esteban Echevar- ria), López defended a historicist/idiographic approach against the univer- salism of liberal political economists (Chiaramonte 1971, 128–29, 133–34). According to López, the idea of free trade is not an absolute principle; rather, its application depends on the particular conditions of each coun- try. If free trade was beneficial for the industrial development of foreign countries, in the Argentinean case, where different industrial and eco- nomic structures were present, free trade was not a solution. In the first phase of industrial development, industries need protection from foreign competition. As one of the protectionist group members, Lucio V. López, said in 1873, “It is a mistake to believe that political economy offers and contains inmutable principles for all nations” (Chiaramonte 1971, 129–30). This critique of the nomothetic/universalist approach of core state intellec- tuals is even stronger in the thesis of one of Vicente F. López’s disciples, Aditardo Heredia, who attacked European intellectuals’ social conceptions as ahistorical and metaphysical. Heredia criticized in particular the Eu- ropean Enlightenment thinkers for aspiring to develop a social science guided by universal and inflexible principles, similar to geometric theorems or algebraic formulas, without attention to the peculiar historical condi- tions of each nation (130). Carlos Pellegrini, one of the leading protectionist deputies, said as early as 1853 that Adam Smith’s beautiful deductions did not pay enough attention to an aspect that influences all human institutions: time (133). The debate was a classical nomothetic-idiographic confronta- tion. The Argentinean scholars opposed a theory based on a concept of an eternal time/space with more particularistic and historicist arguments. The originality of their arguments was to articulate an economic policy in support of a nationalist industrialization project in the periphery of the world economy and to identify relations with England as part of the source of Argentina’s underdevelopment. The economic nationalism of Vicente F. López and his group offered a critique of the dependent relations of Argentina with England and other European centers as early as the 1870s (Chiaramonte 1971, 192–93). Regarding this point, we can quote the following statements made by this protectionist group, which can show some similarities with certain CEPAL-dependentista positions one hundred years later: It is very beautiful...to speak of free trade...this word freedom . . . is so beautiful! But we must understand freedom. For the English who favor free trade, freedom is to allow English factories to manufacture the foreign products, to allow the English merchant to sell the foreign product. This type of freedom transforms the rest of the world into tributary countries; while England is the only nation that enjoys freedom, the remainder are tributary nations; but I do not understand free trade in this manner. By free trade I understand an exchange of finished goods for finished goods. The day our wool can be exported not in the form of a raw material, but rather as a finished frock coat in exchange for England’s iron needles or clock strings, then I would accept free trade, that is, a fin- ished product from our country for a finished product from England. But if free trade consists of sending our wool . . . so England may wash it (when I speak of England I also mean Eu- rope and the rest of the world), manufacture it, and sell it to us through English merchants, brought on English ships and sold by English agents, I do not understand; this is not free trade, this is making a country that does not possess this industry a tributary country. Thus, let’s follow the path of protectionism, given that if we see the history of the manufacturing countries, we will find that their progress is due to protectionism. (Speech by Finance Minister Rufino Varela in the legislature in 1876; cited in Chiaramonte 1971, 182–83) In the English Parliament, one of the illustrious defenders of free trade said that he would like, upholding his doctrine, to make of England the factory of the world and of America the farm of England. He said something very true . . . that to a great extent has been realized, because in effect we are and will be for a long time, if we do not solve this problem, the farm of the great manufacturing nations. (Speech by Carlos Pellegrini at the Cámara de Diputados in 1875; 189) It is impossible to be independent when a country is not self- sufficient, when it does not have all it needs to consume. . . . I know well what the remedies are: they are to have capital to pay ourselves for the elaboration of products and their adaptation for consumption. Only in this way would the country have independence and credit and be saved through its own efforts. (Speech by Vicente F. López at the Cámara de Diputados in 1875; 27) It has been recognized that political independence cannot exist without industrial and mercantile independence. (Speech by a protectionist deputy in 1874; 192) (It is not necessary) to be permanently dependent on foreign capital. . . . I am completely opposed to the establishment of companies with foreign capital. (Deputy Seeber in 1877; 185) Although this nationalist group was questioning the tenets of tra- ditional liberal political economy and the location of Argentina within the world division of labor (Chiaramonte 1971, 193), it is important to indicate that they were committed to a nationalist liberalism. They de- fended protectionism as a transitory, although necessary, stage to direct the country toward economic liberalism. They criticized the supporters of the free-market doctrine because this policy maintained the subordination of Argentina to England. They wished to restrict momentarily the full im- plementation of economic liberalism as a means of achieving it later: The newborn industries needed protection, but once they grew, free markets should be encouraged (191). This doctrine is very close to those of the Ger- man political economist Frederich List and the North American Casey, who also promoted protectionism against England as a necessary develop- mental stage. However, although their names were mentioned several times during the 1870s parliamentary debate (135), the dominant influence upon the Argentinian protectionists in the 1870s came from their own intellec- tual tradition (134–35). In sum, they were commited to national capitalist development through the formation of a local industrial bourgeoisie. Other countries in Latin America, such as Mexico (Potasch 1959) and Chile (Frank 1970) had similar debates during the nineteenth century. Probably the most extreme case in terms of the free-trade and protectionist debates was nineteenth-century Paraguay, where a protectionist regime led by Dr. Francia and the López family was destroyed by a military inter- vention of Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina, aided by the British, to install a free-trade regime. Six out of seven Paraguayan males were killed in the Triple Alliance War. This war was a turning point for the triumph of the free-trade doctrine, which dominated in Latin America during the nineteenth century, the period of British hegemony. Agrarian and mining capitalists profited from selling raw materials or crops to, and buying man- ufactured products from, the British, rather than attempting to compete with them through industrialization. By the end of the nineteenth century, Spencerian evolutionism and Comtian scientism joined forces to form the Latin American version of positivism, which provided the ideological justification for both the economic subordination to the “empire of free trade” and the political domination of the dictatorships of “order and progress.” Scientism, progress, truth, property, evolutionary stagism, and order were all Enlightenment themes reproduced in Auguste Comte’s positivist and Herbert Spencer’s evolution- ary doctrines. They were both used in the Latin American periphery to justify the penetration of foreign capital investments and to promote economic liberalism against “backwardness” and “feudalism.” Evolutionary stagism, inevitable progress, and optimism in science and technology combined to form a teleological view of human history that strengthened the basis of developmentalist ideology. As a result of the U.S. military invasions in the region, the Mexican revolution in 1910, and the disillusionment with liberalism during the First World War, a new wave of nationalism emerged among Latin American elites. Once again, after the First World War, there was a radical questioning of economic liberalism, this time focused against the new hegemon in the region, the United States of America.

#### This fixation on Western development turns the case, destroys the environment, and breeds global self-hatred---the alternative is to reject their framing of the world---change must begin in our minds and the way we think about countries

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The concept of development is everywhere, in our personal lives and in the lives of communities and countries in general. We all believe that we need development. If we do not strive to develop, we get pressured in one way or another to do so. Other people try to force development on us. In talking about countries, people use the concept of developed countries, developing countries or underdeveloped countries. Accordingly, countries such as the USA, Britain, Sweden, Germany, and Japan are considered developed. However, countries such as Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda are considered developing or underdeveloped. These concepts are firmly entrenched in people’s minds. Do we know what we are talking about, when we use these concepts? Do these concepts make sense? Although I used to think like other people--that there are communities or countries that are developed and others that are developing or underdeveloped--I have discovered that these concepts are faulty and unreasonable. I dare say that these concepts confirm the existence of false consciousness in our heads, the product of faulty education. Why do I say this? First, saying that a certain community or country is developed implies that that community or country has reached the peak and is now static. The truth is that there is no community or country in the world that is static. Every society and every country is changing all the time, in different areas and respects: economic, political, cultural and so on. Even those societies or countries considered developed are changing all the time. The USA of three years ago is different from the USA of today, and the USA of five years to come will be different from that of today. Technological changes, for example, occur all the time. The same happens in other fields, such as culture and education. All countries follow that pattern. Changes never end, whether in Tanzania, England, or the USA. If this process of change means development, then every country in the world is a developing country. Therefore, the idea of there being countries that are developed and others that are developing does not make good sense. It is pointless to place some countries in the category of developed countries while they are, like the other countries, changing all the time. The fundamental issue, however, is the concept of development. We need to ask ourselves: what is development, and who defines it? Who sets the criteria for development?

On the whole, some countries, especially those which ruled us during colonialism--the powerful countries in the present world--are the ones which set the standards of development. Because Europe brags that it is developed, Africans and others around the world accept that notion and look at their own countries as developing or underdeveloped countries. These are neo-colonial ideas, an opium that was spread, and continues to be spread, in schools, the media, and many other institutions. We have to free ourselves mentally, so we can think for ourselves, instead of being parrots. We should have sound heads, which we can use for thinking about these issues ourselves. We have to build such an intellectual foundation, so we can reflect on the concept of development and ask ourselves what development is. In doing so, we ought to ask ourselves whether we have to accept the European concept of development. In thinking about development, we have to assume the duty and obligation of establishing our own criteria and using them. We should build the will to trust in ourselves and make our own decisions for our benefit. Without doing this, we will continue being parrots. Whatever they do in Europe or the USA, whatever exists in Europe or the USA, or whatever comes from there, we will see as development. The way things are, we believe completely that imitating the people of Europe or the USA constitutes development. If they initiate something, we want to imitate it. Our criteria for education, good governance, democracy, and so on are set by them. We have become perpetual followers. In the meantime, the people of Europe and the USA do not see anything of ours as development. It is only when we imitate their things that we get counted as developing. Even if we start anything, they do not see it as development. And we ourselves, looking at Europe and USA, don’t believe that what we do is development. If the thing had started in Europe or USA, we would have seen it as development. Even if something has no meaning, or has negative effects, as long as it is from Europe or the USA, people in our countries see it as development. Even if the things go against humanity, as long as they have come from Europe, our people see them as development. I can offer an example. Countries that are called developed have managed to build big cities, factories and different kinds of infrastructure, thereby appearing developed. Though there is considerable destruction of the environment in this development, the idea that these countries are developed remains intact, and we struggle to imitate them. We toil relentlessly to follow the same path they took, of destroying the environment through building factories and infrastructure. We do not care that what we call development has ruined and continues to ruin the environment. We want factories, without considering the effects on the water we use, the air we breathe, and the environment in general. We do not care that the development of Europe and the USA has destroyed social relationships creating debilitating alienation in people’s lives. Is this development? As I have stated, there is no country that is static, not changing. The mistake we make is not paying attention to this truth and, instead, looking at the countries of Europe and America as developed. Slavishly following everything European or American, we will remain forever in self-contempt, looking at ourselves as developing countries or undeveloped countries. With this perspective, we will never be on the same level as the countries we call developed. As long as we regard ourselves as being backward, we will remain backward. We will remain trapped in the belief that we are developing countries or underdeveloped countries. The people of Europe and America will continue to see what they do as development, and they will continue to push us along the path they see as development. We will continue to be always followers. There are, already, many so called development programs in our country and institutions from outside working on initiatives called development programs. Are we sure that these are not perpetuating the problem I am highlighting? We have an obligation to liberate ourselves mentally and establish our own standards. Without such standards, which would take into account the right of every people in the world to contribute to the formulation of the concept and criteria of development, it is not right to continue talking about developed countries and developing or underdeveloped countries. We have to change our thinking; we should reject the existing tradition of being called or calling ourselves developing countries, a tradition that reflect mental dependency, the mind of parrots, neo-colonialism. The effects of this dependency complex are evident everywhere. When we talk about the economic system, for example, we find ourselves struggling to imitate the reality of Europe and America. When we talk about education, the same applies. We struggle to follow the standards of Europe and America. Today, in our country, if someone starts a school and calls it Cambridge Academy, and another person starts one and calls it Lindi Academy, people will be attracted to the Cambridge Academy, without any thinking. When we talk about beauty, for example, it is the same thing. We follow European and American standards.

## Off

#### Interpretation—“economic engagement” means the aff must be an exclusively economic action

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The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change the target state‟s behaviour and to improve bilateral relations.94 Economic engagement is academically wielded in several respects. It recommends that the state engage the target country in the international community (with the there existing rules) and modify the target state‟s run foreign policy, thus preventing the emergence of a potential enemy.95 Thus, this strategy aims to ensure safety in particular, whereas economic benefit is not a priority objective. Objectives of economic engagement indicate that this form of engagement is designed for relations with problematic countries – those that pose a potential danger to national security of a state that implements economic engagement. Professor of the University of California Paul Papayoanou and University of Maryland professor Scott Kastner say that economic engagement should be used in relations with the emerging powers: countries which accumulate more and more power, and attempt a new division of power in the international system – i.e., pose a serious challenge for the status quo in the international system (the latter theorists have focused specifically on China-US relations). These theorists also claim that economic engagement is recommended in relations with emerging powers whose regimes are not democratic – that is, against such players in the international system with which it is difficult to agree on foreign policy by other means.96 Meanwhile, other supporters of economic engagement (for example, professor of the University of California Miles Kahler) are not as categorical and do not exclude the possibility to realize economic engagement in relations with democratic regimes.97 Proponents of economic engagement believe that the economy may be one factor which leads to closer relations and cooperation (a more peaceful foreign policy and the expected pledge to cooperate) between hostile countries – closer economic ties will develop the target state‟s dependence on economic engagement implementing state for which such relations will also be cost-effective (i.e., the mutual dependence). However, there are some important conditions for the economic factor in engagement to be effective and bring the desired results. P. Papayoanou and S. Kastner note that economic engagement gives the most positive results when initial economic relations with the target state is minimal and when the target state‟s political forces are interested in development of international economic relations. Whether economic relations will encourage the target state to develop more peaceful foreign policy and willingness to cooperate will depend on the extent to which the target state‟s forces with economic interests are influential in internal political structure. If the target country‟s dominant political coalition includes the leaders or groups interested in the development of international economic relations, economic ties between the development would bring the desired results. Academics note that in non-democratic countries in particular leaders often have an interest to pursue economic cooperation with the powerful economic partners because that would help them maintain a dominant position in their own country.98 Proponents of economic engagement do not provide a detailed description of the means of this form of engagement, but identify a number of possible variants of engagement: conditional economic engagement, using the restrictions caused by economic dependency and unconditional economic engagement by exploiting economic dependency caused by the flow. Conditional economic engagement, sometimes called linkage or economic carrots engagement, could be described as conflicting with economic sanctions. A state that implements this form of engagement instead of menacing to use sanctions for not changing policy course promises for a target state to provide more economic benefits in return for the desired political change. Thus, in this case economic ties are developed depending on changes in the target state‟s behaviour.99 Unconditional economic engagement is more moderate form of engagement. Engagement applying state while developing economic relations with an adversary hopes that the resulting economic dependence over time will change foreign policy course of the target state and reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. Theorists assume that economic dependence may act as a restriction of target state‟s foreign policy or as transforming factor that changes target state‟s foreign policy objectives.100 Thus, economic engagement focuses solely on economic measures (although theorists do not give a more detailed description), on strategically important actors of the international arena and includes other types of engagement, such as the conditional-unconditional economic engagement.

#### Energy is non-economic engagement

**Australian Government, 11** (“The White Paper and Australia’s Strategic Relationship with China”, 9/28

<http://asiancentury.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/public-submissions/nd.doc>

Australia risks losing a healthy relationship with Asia due to overdependence on trade relations and shortcomings of soft power. As trade and economic ties continue to grow between Australia and China, non-economic bilateral relations must be improved in order for general engagement to remain stable. To keep pace with the Asian Century, Australia must strive to find greater common ground with China outside of trade and commerce. The White Paper should take into consideration issues of non-economic relations in order to fully address Australia’s long term relationship with China. Some possible considerations for the White Paper to take into account in building a strategy for improving non-economic engagement with China:  Increased frequency of diplomatic visits and high-level visits; building a policy for minimum frequency and level of such diplomatic engagement  Increasing volume and breadth of non-diplomatic high-level exchanges such as academic conferences, exchange trips between sister agencies, and two-way exchanges between schools by dramatically increasing government funding or subsidization of such engagement  Encouraging bilateral cooperation and partnerships between non-economically driven organisations such as public sector agencies and think tanks for the purpose of fostering mutual investments between China and Australia where more than trade or profit is in question  Encouraging cultural literacy in the Australian population through people-to-people exchange, tourism, and language training; in particular encouraging Mandarin study for non-heritage students from an early age  Increasing funding for China-Australia partnerships on development in science, math, energy, environment and technology; mitigating the risk and impact of China’s capabilities surpassing those of Australia in the near future  Cultivating soft power through aid funding and development projects

#### Voting issue—

#### Limits—they explode the topic—blurring the lines between economic and other forms of engagement makes any interaction with another country topical—it’s impossible to predict or prepare

## off

#### Obama’s political capital is successfully holding off a sanctions vote now—it’s key to Reid which is the linchpin for holding off a vote.

Rubin 2/11/14

Jennifer, Staff writer at Washington Post, Reid under fire for defying majority on sanctions, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2014/02/11/reid-under-fire-for-defying-majority-on-sanctions/>

The largest and most dependable pro-Israel group, Christians United for Israel, is going after Sen. Harry Reid (D-Nev.) **for bottling up a vote on Iran sanctions**, which a bipartisan majority in the Senate supports. It sent out an alert to its six-figure strong membership [UPDATE: A CUFI rep says the membership is now 1.6 million] making the case that “if this bill were ever brought for a vote, it would pass the Senate by a wide margin. But one man, Senate Majority Leader Harry **Reid**, is preventing this bill from ever seeing the light of day. We know that Harry Reid is under enormous pressure from President Obama. But this is no excuse for putting partisan politics before the security of his country and the will of the people.” After just three hours, the message generated 10,000 calls or e-mails to Reid, according to a CUFI representative. By focusing on just Reid, CUFI is, in my estimation wisely, making the point that this is not Democrat vs. Republican, but White House and Reid vs. a bipartisan coalition. CUFI executive director David Brog explained to me the reasoning behind the sanctions push: “Not to act is to act. Kicking the sanctions can down the road is simply going to force us to choose between two horribles — a nuclear Iran or war with Iran.” He adds, “Now that our economic pressure is working, we must press our advantage as the only alternative to reinvigorate diplomacy and ensure a deal can be made that doesn’t simply ratify Iran’s nuclear capability. “We’re supporting it with everything we’ve got for one simple reason — there may not be another chance.” Brog also argued, “When it came to judicial nominees, he lectured the country at great length about the need for majority rule. But now that we’re debating a fundamental issue of war and peace, he’s blocking the clear will of a large majority without the slightest compunction.” **I don’t believe CUFI is under any illusion that Reid will see the light on either substantive policy grounds or on procedural consistency** (perish the thought). But it is incumbent on those advocates who in the weeks and months ahead may be advocating more confrontational measures to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons program to make every effort to support lesser, alternative steps first. They can’t help it if the president refuses to take up those measures.

#### Plan requires political capital

OECD 9 (ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Managing for Development Results, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/42447575.pdf>, March 2009) \*\*MfDR is Managing for Development Results\*\*

No two countries implement MfDR in exactly the same way. While changes in planning and budgeting processes are the most common and logical entry points for improving the approach, some countries have begun with changes in monitoring and evaluation of programmes, changes in civil service procedures, or changes in project planning and selection. Each of these actions, properly conceived and executed, can yield tangible results and support a cycle of performance improvement. Launching a serious MfDR process usually requires committed leaders with extensive credibility and a willingness to spend political capital to reform entrenched systems and improve government performance. The 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, which examines progress on aid effectiveness, found that the proportion of countries with “largely developed results-oriented frameworks” was a modest 5%. However, 56% of countries reported having taken some action since 2005. Experience suggests that fully institutionalising the approach takes a minimum of seven years. In most countries, this means that the process spans at least one political transition, and much of that time is taken up with important but relatively unglamorous efforts to change core systems and assemble a valid empirical basis for decisions. For this reason, it is essential to develop constituencies inside and outside of government and to ensure that the process is not seen as partisan or donor driven. N

#### Causes Israel strikes

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As 2013 draws to close, the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program have entered a delicate stage. But in 2014, the tensions will escalate dramatically as a bipartisan group of Senators brings a new Iran sanctions bill to the floor for a vote. As many others have warned, that promise of new measures against Tehran will almost certainly blow up the interim deal reached by the Obama administration and its UN/EU partners in Geneva. But Congress' highly unusual intervention into the President's domain of foreign policy doesn't just make the prospect of an American conflict with Iran more likely. As it turns out, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act essentially empowers Israel to decide whether the United States will go to war against Tehran.¶ On their own, the tough new sanctions imposed automatically if a final deal isn't completed in six months pose a daunting enough challenge for President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry. But it is the legislation's commitment to support an Israeli preventive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities that almost ensures the U.S. and Iran will come to blows. As Section 2b, part 5 of the draft mandates:¶ If the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran's nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence.¶ Now, the legislation being pushed by Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL), Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) does not automatically give the President an authorization to use force should Israel attack the Iranians. (The draft language above explicitly states that the U.S. government must act "in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force.") But there should be little doubt that an AUMF would be forthcoming from Congressmen on both sides of the aisle. As Lindsey Graham, who with Menendez co-sponsored a similar, non-binding "stand with Israel" resolution in March told a Christians United for Israel (CUFI) conference in July:¶ "If nothing changes in Iran, come September, October, I will present a resolution that will authorize the use of military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb."¶ Graham would have plenty of company from the hardest of hard liners in his party. In August 2012, Romney national security adviser and pardoned Iran-Contra architect Elliott Abrams called for a war authorization in the pages of the Weekly Standard. And just two weeks ago, Norman Podhoretz used his Wall Street Journal op-ed to urge the Obama administration to "strike Iran now" to avoid "the nuclear war sure to come."¶ But at the end of the day, the lack of an explicit AUMF in the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act doesn't mean its supporters aren't giving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu de facto carte blanche to hit Iranian nuclear facilities. The ensuing Iranian retaliation against to Israeli and American interests would almost certainly trigger the commitment of U.S. forces anyway.¶ Even if the Israelis alone launched a strike against Iran's atomic sites, Tehran will almost certainly hit back against U.S. targets in the Straits of Hormuz, in the region, possibly in Europe and even potentially in the American homeland. Israel would face certain retaliation from Hezbollah rockets launched from Lebanon and Hamas missiles raining down from Gaza.¶ That's why former Bush Defense Secretary Bob Gates and CIA head Michael Hayden raising the alarms about the "disastrous" impact of the supposedly surgical strikes against the Ayatollah's nuclear infrastructure. As the New York Times reported in March 2012, "A classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials." And that September, a bipartisan group of U.S. foreign policy leaders including Brent Scowcroft, retired Admiral William Fallon, former Republican Senator (now Obama Pentagon chief) Chuck Hagel, retired General Anthony Zinni and former Ambassador Thomas Pickering concluded that American attacks with the objective of "ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear bomb" would "need to conduct a significantly expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period of time, likely several years." (Accomplishing regime change, the authors noted, would mean an occupation of Iran requiring a "commitment of resources and personnel greater than what the U.S. has expended over the past 10 years in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined.") The anticipated blowback?¶ Serious costs to U.S. interests would also be felt over the longer term, we believe, with problematic consequences for global and regional stability, including economic stability. A dynamic of escalation, action, and counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that would significantly increase all of these costs and lead, potentially, to all-out regional war.

#### Great power war

Rafael Reuveny 10, PhD, Professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University, "Unilateral Strike on Iran could trigger world Depression", Op-ed distributed through McClatchy Newspaper Co, <http://www.indiana.edu/~spea/news/speaking_out/reuveny_on_unilateral_strike_Iran.shtml>

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash. For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force. Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground. All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians, but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well. By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early-warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces. Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike — or even numerous strikes — could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond. A regional war Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981**,** Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents. Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat. In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973. An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe. The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey — all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony. Replaying Nixon’s nightmare Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario. Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted. If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons, but would probably not risk using force.

¶ While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.

## Off

#### Chinese influence is increasing and replacing Mexico’s need for US involvement

Shahani ’13 – Arjan, “Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Visit to Mexico,” AQ, 6/5/13, <http://www.americasquarterly.org/chinese-president-xi-jinping-visit-to-mexico>

Slowly but surely, from a diplomatic standpoint, Mexico is taking steps to reestablish itself as an outspoken, independent and active player, and is engaging emerging and established world powers beyond its neighbor to the North. In April, Peña Nieto’s participation in the conference of the Boao Forum For Asia—a China-based forum similar to the World Economic Forum—and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Mexico this week are a clear example of Mexico’s global pivot. President Xi’s visit, foreshadows a stronger bilateral commercial and diplomatic relationship. Fox and Calderón did very little to maintain the strategic alliance that the PRI had built with China, and Calderón angered the Chinese government in 2011 when he received the Dalai Lama at the presidential residence. But now, officials from the federal government and representatives from the private sector involved in President Xi’s visit are predicting the launch of a strategic, integral and functional alliance between China and Mexico. They are not exaggerating: as agreements reached during the visit show, this is much more than Xi making a courtesy call. Amapola Grijalva, vice president of the Mexico-China Chamber of Commerce, told journalist Darío Celis in a June 3 radio interview that “agreements reached between the two delegations will help narrow the commercial balance gap between the countries, will open up a huge market for Mexican exporters, and will allow China to provide financing for important heavy infrastructure projects in the near future.” Grijalva estimates that “during Peña’s administration, up to $81 billion coming from China could go into financing new industrial naval port complexes, airports, telecom projects, and railway transportation systems.” A joint declaration signed and issued by Peña Nieto and Xi on June 4 summarizes the amount of work already invested in the renewed Mexico-China relationship. The two leaders signed memorandums of understanding to formally establish cooperation in energy, mining, emerging industries, infrastructure, private sector collaboration, university alliances, trade, banking, and even the oil industry. In addition, it was announced that sanitary measures have been met to reopen the Chinese market to pork from Mexico, and an agreement was reached to allow all forms of tequila into China. Additionally, to promote tourism in both countries, Peña Nieto and Xi expressed their mutual interest in expanding international flights connecting Mexico and China and in establishing a working relationship between their tourism ministries. In the political arena, Peña Nieto took the opportunity to amend Calderón’s diplomatic gaffe by ratifying the “One China” principle. Peña Nieto stated that it is Mexico’s position that both Taiwan and the Tibet are part of Chinese territory and Tibetan affairs are an internal issue for China. In the statement, both parties declared that “given the improvement of diverse mechanisms in the bilateral cooperation, the conditions are such that Mexico-China relations can be elevated to a new level of benefit to both nations.” They also established a calendar of working visits from high-level government officials to implement the agreements and scheduled future meetings during upcoming international forums including the UN, APEC and the G20. As President Xi’s visit shows, the coming years are certain to bring Mexico and China diplomatically closer and to catalyze economic growth, trade and development in a mutually beneficial way—while breaking Mexico’s trade dependency on the U.S. market.

#### Engagement is zero-sum

Dowd ‘12

Alan Dowd, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, 2012, “Crisis in the America's,” <http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas>

Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be what’s happening in China’s backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps it’s time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countries—from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chile—border the Pacific. Given Beijing’s actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.¶ Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine.¶ Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas, this “Monroe Doctrine 2.0” would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes China’s efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages any claims of control—implied or explicit—by China over territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere.¶ In short, what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

#### Decline collapses the CCP

Li, “China’s Team of Rivals” March/April ‘9

(Cheng, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\_id=4686)

The two dozen senior politicians who walk the halls of Zhongnanhai, the compound of the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership in Beijing, are worried. What was inconceivable a year ago now threatens their rule: an economy in freefall. Exports, critical to China’s searing economic growth, have plunged. Thousands of factories and businesses, especially those in the prosperous coastal regions, have closed. In the last six months of 2008, 10 million workers, plus 1 million new college graduates, joined the already gigantic ranks of the country’s unemployed. During the same period, the Chinese stock market lost 65 percent of its value, equivalent to $3 trillion. The crisis, President Hu Jintao said recently, “is a test of our ability to control a complex situation, and also a test of our party’s governing ability.”

With this rapid downturn, the Chinese Communist Party suddenly looks vulnerable. Since Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms three decades ago, the party’s legitimacy has relied upon its ability to keep the economy running at breakneck pace. If China is no longer able to maintain a high growth rate or provide jobs for its ever growing labor force, massive public dissatisfaction and social unrest could erupt. No one realizes this possibility more than the handful of people who steer China’s massive economy. Double-digit growth has sheltered them through a SARS epidemic, massive earthquakes, and contamination scandals. Now, the crucial question is whether they are equipped to handle an economic crisis of this magnitude—and survive the political challenges it will bring.

#### Party instability causes nuclear lashout

Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs – Princeton, Asia Expert – CFR, ‘10

(Aaron, “Implications of the Financial Crisis for the US-China Rivalry,” *Survival*, Volume 52, Issue 4, August, p. 31 – 54)

Despite its magnitude, Beijing's stimulus programme was insufficient to forestall a sizeable spike in unemployment. The regime acknowledges that upwards of 20 million migrant workers lost their jobs in the first year of the crisis, with many returning to their villages, and 7m recent college graduates are reportedly on the streets in search of work.9 Not surprisingly, tough times have been accompanied by increased social turmoil. Even before the crisis hit, the number of so-called 'mass incidents' (such as riots or strikes) reported each year in China had been rising. Perhaps because it feared that the steep upward trend might be unnerving to foreign investors, Beijing stopped publishing aggregate, national statistics in 2005.10 Nevertheless, there is ample, if fragmentary, evidence that things got worse as the economy slowed. In Beijing, for example, salary cuts, layoffs, factory closures and the failure of business owners to pay back wages resulted in an almost 100% increase in the number of labour disputes brought before the courts.11 Since the early days of the current crisis, the regime has clearly been bracing itself for trouble. Thus, at the start of 2009, an official news-agency story candidly warned Chinese readers that the country was, 'without a doubt … entering a peak period of mass incidents'.12 In anticipation of an expected increase in unrest, the regime for the first time summoned all 3,080 county-level police chiefs to the capital to learn the latest riot-control tactics, and over 200 intermediate and lower-level judges were also called in for special training.13 Beijing's stimulus was insufficient At least for the moment, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) appears to be weathering the storm. But if in the next several years the economy slumps again or simply fails to return to its previous pace, Beijing's troubles will mount. The regime probably has enough repressive capacity to cope with a good deal more turbulence than it has thus far encountered, but a protracted crisis could eventually pose a challenge to the solidarity of the party's leadership and thus to its continued grip on political power. Sinologist Minxin Pei points out that the greatest danger to CCP rule comes not from below but from above. Rising societal discontent 'might be sufficient to tempt some members of the elite to exploit the situation to their own political advantage' using 'populist appeals to weaken their rivals and, in the process, open[ing] up divisions within the party's seemingly unified upper ranks'.14 If this happens, all bets will be off and a very wide range of outcomes, from a democratic transition to a bloody civil war, will suddenly become plausible. Precisely because it is aware of this danger, the regime has been very careful to keep whatever differences exist over how to deal with the current crisis within bounds and out of view. If there are significant rifts they could become apparent in the run-up to the pending change in leadership scheduled for 2012. Short of causing the regime to unravel, a sustained economic crisis could induce it to abandon its current, cautious policy of avoiding conflict with other countries while patiently accumulating all the elements of 'comprehensive national power'. If they believe that their backs are to the wall, China's leaders might even be tempted to lash out, perhaps provoking a confrontation with a foreign power in the hopes of rallying domestic support and deflecting public attention from their day-to-day troubles. Beijing might also choose to implement a policy of 'military Keynesianism', further accelerating its already ambitious plans for military construction in the hopes of pumping up aggregate demand and resuscitating a sagging domestic economy.15 In sum, despite its impressive initial performance, Beijing is by no means on solid ground. The reverberations from the 2008-09 financial crisis may yet shake the regime to its foundations, and could induce it to behave in unexpected, and perhaps unexpectedly aggressive, ways.

## Off

#### The United States federal government should limit the president’s war power authority for self-defense targeted killings to outside an armed conflict.

#### Conflation of legal regimes for targeted killing results in overly constrained operations—undermines counterterrorism

Geoffrey Corn, South Texas College of Law, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, J.D., 10/22/11, Self-defense Targeting: Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1947838

At the core of the self-defense targeting theory is the assumption that the jus ad bellum provides sufficient authority to both justify and regulate the application of combat power.71 This assumption ignores an axiom of jus belli development: the compartmentalization of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.72 As Colonel G.I.A.D. Draper noted in 1971, “equal application of the Law governing the conduct of armed conflicts to those illegally resorting to armed forces and those lawfully resorting thereto is accepted as axiomatic in modern International Law.”73 This compartmentalization is the historic response to the practice of defining jus in bello obligations by reference to the jus ad bellum legality of conflict.74 As the jus in bello evolved to focus on the humanitarian protection of victims of war, to include the armed forces themselves,75 the practice of denying LOAC applicability based on assertions of conflict illegality became indefensible.76 Instead, the de facto nature of hostilities would dictate jus in bello applicability, and the jus ad bellum legal basis for hostilities would be irrelevant to this determination.77

This compartmentalization lies at the core of the Geneva Convention lawtriggering equation.78 Adoption of the term “armed conflict” as the primary triggering consideration for jus in bello applicability was a deliberate response to the more formalistic jus in bello applicability that predated the 1949 revision of the Geneva Conventions.79 Prior to these revisions, in bello applicability often turned on the existence of a state of war in the international legal sense, which in turn led to assertions of inapplicability as the result of assertions of unlawful aggression.80 Determined to prevent the denial of humanitarian regulation to situations necessitating such regulation—any de facto armed conflict—the 1949 Conventions sought to neutralize the impact of ad bellum legality in law applicability analysis.81

This effort rapidly became the norm of international law.82 Armed conflict analysis simply did not include conflict legality considerations.83 National military manuals, international jurisprudence and expert commentary all reflect this development.84 This division is today a fundamental LOAC tenet—and is beyond dispute.85 In fact, for many years the United States has gone even farther, extending application of LOAC principles beyond situations of armed conflict altogether so as to regulate any military operation.86 This is just another manifestation of the fact that States, or perhaps more importantly the armed forces that do their bidding, view the cause or purported justification for such operations as irrelevant when deciding what rules apply to regulate operational and tactical execution.

This aspect of ad bellum/in bello compartmentalization is not called into question by the self-defense targeting concept.87 Nothing in the assertion that combat operations directed against transnational non-State belligerent groups qualifies as armed conflict suggests the inapplicability of LOAC regulatory norms on the basis of the relative illegitimacy of al Qaeda’s efforts to inflict harm on the United States and other victim States (although as noted earlier, this was implicit in the original Bush administration approach to the war on terror).88 Instead, the self-defense targeting concept reflects an odd inversion of the concern that motivated the armed conflict law trigger. The concept does not assert the illegitimacy of the terrorist cause to deny LOAC principles to operations directed against them.89 Instead, it relies on the legality of the U.S. cause to dispense with the need for applying LOAC principles to regulate these operations.90 This might not be explicit, but it is clear that an exclusive focus on ad bellum principles indicates that these principles subsume in bello conflict regulation norms.91

There are two fundamental flaws with this conflation. First, by contradicting the traditional compartmentalization between the two branches of the jus belli,92 it creates a dangerous precedent. Although there is no express resurrection of the just war concept of LOAC applicability, by focusing exclusively on jus ad bellum legality and principles, the concept suggests the inapplicability of jus in bello regulation as the result of the legality of the U.S. cause. To be clear, I believe U.S. counterterror operations are legally justified actions in self-defense. However, this should not be even implicitly relied on to deny jus in bello applicability to operations directed against terrorist opponents, precisely because it may be viewed as suggesting the invalidity of the opponent’s cause deprives them of the protections of that law, or that the operations are somehow exempted from LOAC regulation. Second, even discounting this detrimental precedential effect, the conflation of ad bellum and in bello principles to regulate the execution of operations is extremely troubling.93 This is because the meaning of these principles is distinct within each branch of the jus belli.94

Furthermore, because the scope of authority derived from jus ad bellum principles purportedly invoked to regulate operational execution is more restrictive than that derived from their jus in bello counterparts,95 this conflation produces a potential windfall for terrorist operatives. Thus, the ad bellum/in bello conflation is ironically self-contradictory. In one sense, it suggests the inapplicability of jus in bello protections to the illegitimate terrorist enemy because of the legitimacy of the U.S. cause.96 In another sense, the more restrictive nature of the jus ad bellum principles it substitutes for the jus in bello variants to regulate operational execution provides the enemy with increased protection from attack.97 Neither of these consequences is beneficial, nor necessary. Instead, compliance with the traditional jus ad bellum/jus in bello compartmentalization methodology averts these consequences and offers a more rational approach to counterterrorism conflict regulation.98

## Ex-Im

#### No modeling

Loris 13 (An economist specializing in energy and environmental issues, Nicolas Loris is the Heritage Foundation’s Herbert and Joyce Morgan Fellow., 1/30/2013, "No 'Following the Leader' on Climate Change", www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2013/1/no-following-the-leader-on-climate-change)

In his second inaugural address, President Obama pledged that the United States “will respond to the threat of climate change” and will take the lead for other countries to follow suit. This commitment is a willful rejection of reality. Congress has been unwilling to address climate change unilaterally through legislation. Multilateral attempts become more futile each year as major players, especially developing nations such as China and India, refuse to play ball. And why should they? Developing nations are not going to curb economic growth to solve a theoretical problem when their citizens face far more pressing environmental problems — especially when so many are trapped in grinding poverty and lack access to reliable electricity. This leaves the president with only one option for making good on his pledge: impose costly regulatory actions. This approach would be as pointless as unilateral legislative action. Why? Even accepting as fact the theory that Earth is warming and that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions are a warming agent does not make any of the following true: &bull; Man-made emissions are driving climate change and are a negative externality that needs to be internalized. Greenhouse gas emissions are a warming agent. But that fact doesn’t begin to settle the scientific debate about climate change and climate sensitivity — the amount of warming projected from increased greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, viewing man-made carbon dioxide as a strictly negative externality ignores a lot of peer-reviewed literature that identifies many positive effects (e.g., plant growth, human longevity, seed enrichment and less soil erosion as a result of more robust tree root growth) associated with higher levels of CO2 in the atmosphere. • Earth is cooking at a catastrophic rate. The media breathlessly reported that a recent National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s study found 2012 to be the warmest on record for the continental United States. What they largely failed to report was that, globally, 2012 was only the ninth-warmest in the past 34 years. In fact, average global temperatures have leveled off over the past decade and a half. • Sea levels will rise dramatically, threatening America’s coastlines. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report, the bible of CO2-reduction proponents, projects sea levels rising 7 inches to 23 inches over the next century. That’s not as alarming as it sounds. Sea level has risen at the lower end of that projection over the past two centuries. • There will be more extreme droughts, heat waves, hurricanes and other natural disasters. Natural disasters (they’re called “natural” for a reason, right?) will occur with or without increased man-made emissions. Having failed repeatedly to win legislation limiting greenhouse gas emissions, the Obama administration appears bent on taking the regulatory route. The Environmental Protection Agency is promulgating stringent emission standards for new power plants that would effectively prohibit construction of coal-fired generators and prematurely shut down existing plants. The EPA also has introduced costly new air-quality standards for hydraulically fractured wells and new fuel-efficiency standards that will make cars and light-duty trucks more expensive, smaller and less safe. Restricting greenhouse gas emissions, whether unilaterally or multilaterally, will impose huge costs on consumers and the U.S. economy as a whole. Congress should exercise its seldom-used muscles as regulatory watchdog to keep regulatory proposals that are not cost-effective from full implementation and reverse the administration’s course on regulating CO2. As for the president’s suggestion that unilateral action by the U.S. will somehow inspire other countries to emulate our example — the repeated failure of U.N. negotiations to produce multilateral climate action demonstrates a near universal disinclination to sacrifice economic growth on the altar of global warming. President Obama should respond to the threat of climate change by acknowledging that the severity of the threat is low and the costs of action are painfully high. And that unilateral action by the United States won’t make a dent in Earth’s temperature anyway.

#### Multilat doesn’t solve warming

Falkner ’12 (Robert Falkner is a Reader in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He holds degrees in politics and economics from Munich University and a doctorate in international relations from Oxford University. He is an associate of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at LSE and of the Energy, Environment and Development Programme at Chatham House. He has published widely on global environmental politics; “The crisis of environmental multilateralism: a liberal response”; 2012—recently edited in 2013; 2http://personal.lse.ac.uk/Falkner/\_private/Falkner\_2012\_Environmental\_multilateralism\_in\_crisis.pdf)

Despite the dramatic rise of international environmental policymaking, recent developments suggest that environmental multilateralism is entering a period of crisis. As the latest Global% Environment% Outlook report of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) reveals, **multilateral environmental policy has failed to reverse, or even slow down, some of the most threatening environmental trends such as global warming and biodiversity loss.** Environmental campaigners and diplomats may have succeeded in establishing the environment on the international agenda and negotiating a plethora of environmental treaties, but whether international instruments make a difference on the ground remains far from clear. Moreover, the process of international environmental policySmaking has slowed down in recent years. Environmental multilateralism itself is being held back by global power struggles and a general sense of treaty fatigue. A loss of political momentum has been evident for some time in the climate change negotiations, which have failed to deliver a new treaty that could succeed the Kyoto Protocol. This was again noticeable at the recent 3 ‘Rio+20’ UN summit, which fell well below the aspirations and achievements of the original Rio ‘Earth Summit’ of 1992.

#### No Russia--China alliance---geography

Zeihan 8 (Peter Zeihan, Stratfor, 2008. “China and Russia’s Geographic Divide,” http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/china\_and\_russia\_s\_geographic\_divide)

China and Russia are anything but natural partners. While their economic interests may seem complementary, geography dictates that their actual connections will be sharply limited. Moreover, in their roles of resource provider versus producer, they actually have a commercial relationship analogous to that of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries versus the United States — with all the angst and distrust that suggests. Strategically, the two tend to swim in different pools, but they still share a borderland. Borderlands — where one great state flows into another — are dangerous places, as their precise locations ebb and flow with the geopolitical tides. And the only thing more likely to generate borderland friction than when one side is strong and the other weak is when both sides are strong. Currently, both China and Russia are becoming more powerful simultaneously, creating ample likelihood that the two will slide toward confrontation in regions of overlapping interest.

## Mexico

**No Mexican econ collapse**

**Couch, 2012** (Neil, Brigadier, British Army, July 2012, “Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse’: Reality or Exaggeration?,” http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-house-papers/2012-seaford-house-papers/SHP-2012-Couch.pdf)

A ‘collapsed’ state, however, as postulated in the Pentagon JOE paper, suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’.16 **Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico disappearing like those earlier European states seems** implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and higher predicted growth than either the UK, Germany or the USA; that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours, which was the ‘one constant’ in the European experience according to Tilly; and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities’ that Rotberg says is a feature common amongst failed states.17,18 A review of the literature does not reveal why the JOE paper might have suggested criminal gangs and drug cartels as direct causes leading to state collapse. Crime and corruption tend to be described not as causes but as symptoms demonstrating failure. For example, a study for Defense Research and Development Canada attempting to build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either.19 One of the principal scholars on the subject, Rotberg, says that in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as effect rather than trigger.20 The Fund for Peace Failed States Index, does not use either of them as a ‘headline’ indicator, though both are used as contributory factors. This absence may reflect an assessment that **numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail**. Mandel describes the corruption and extreme violence of the Chinese Triads, Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza and the Russian Mob that, in some cases, has continued for centuries.21 Yet none of these countries were singled out as potential collapsed or failed states in the Pentagon’s paper. Indeed, thousands of Americans were killed in gang warfare during Prohibition and many people ‘knew or at least suspected that politicians, judges, lawyers, bankers and business concerns collected many millions of dollars from frauds, bribes and various forms of extortion’.22 Organised crime and corruption were the norm in the political, business, and judicial systems and police forces ran their own ‘rackets’ rather than enforcing the law.23 **Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure**.

#### No risk of Asia war – Peaceful China and multilateral institutions

Bitzinger 9

[Richard, Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Barry, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Director of the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, “ Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival | vol. 50 no. 6 | December 2008–January 2009

The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnational terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely. This is not to say that the region will not undergo significant changes. The rise of China constitutes perhaps the most significant challenge to regional security and stability – and, from Washington’s vantage point, to American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. The United States increasingly sees China as its key peer challenger in Asia: China was singled out in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review as having, among the ‘major and emerging powers … the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States’.1 Although the United States has been the hegemon in the Asia-Pacific since the end of the Second World War, it will probably not remain so over the next 25 years. A rising China will present a critical foreign-policy challenge, in some ways more difficult than that posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.2 While the Soviet Union was a political and strategic competitor, China will be a formidable political, strategic and economic competitor. This development will lead to profound changes in the strategic environment of the Asia-Pacific. Still, the rise of China does not automatically mean that conflict is more likely; the emergence of a more assertive China does not mean a more aggressive China. While Beijing is increasingly prone to push its own agenda, defend its interests, engage in more nationalistic – even chauvinistic – behaviour (witness the Olympic torch counter-protests), and seek to displace the United States as the regional hegemon, this does not necessarily translate into an expansionist or warlike China. If anything, Beijing appears content to press its claims peacefully (if forcefully) through existing avenues and institutions of international relations, particularly by co-opting these to meet its own purposes. This ‘soft power’ process can be described as an emerging ‘Beijing Consensus’ in regional international affairs. Moreover, when the Chinese military build-up is examined closely, it is clear that the country’s war machine, while certainly worth taking seriously, is not quite as threatening as some might argue.

#### No risk of nuclear terror

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, <http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html>)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

## Agriculture

#### Food shortage doesn’t cause war – best studies

Allouche, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT, ‘11

(Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.

Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations

In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.

In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.

The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.

None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).

As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984).

The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006).

In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.

The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).

#### Alt causes to food shocks---

#### First, warming

Damian **Carrington 11**, head environment reporter at the Guardian, “Food prices driven up by global warming, study shows”, May 5, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/may/05/food-prices-global-warming>

Global warming has already harmed the world's food production and has driven up food prices by as much as 20% over recent decades, new research has revealed. The drop in the productivity of crop plants around the world was not caused by changes in rainfall but was because higher temperatures can cause dehydration, prevent pollination and lead to slowed photosynthesis. Lester Brown, president of the Earth Policy Institute, Washington DC, said the findings indicate a turning point: "Agriculture as it exists today evolved over 11,000 years of reasonably stable climate, but that climate system is no more." Adaptation is difficult because our knowledge of the future is not strong enough to drive new investments, he said, "so we just keep going, hoping for the best." The scientists say their work shows how crucial it is to find ways to adapt farming to a warmer world, to ensure that rises in global population are matched by rising food production. "It is vital," said Wolfram Schlenker, at Columbia University in New York and one of the research team. "If we continue to have the same seed varieties and temperatures continue to rise, then food prices will rise further. [Addressing] that is the big question." The new research joins a small number of studies in which the fingerprint of climate change has been separated from natural variations in weather and other factors, demonstrating that the effects of warming have already been felt in the world. Scientists have shown that the chance of the severe heatwave that killed thousands in Europe in 2003 was made twice as likely by global warming, while other work showed that the floods that caused £3.5bn of damage in England in 2000 were made two to three times more likely.

#### And weather

Tim **Schooley 11**, Pittsburgh Business Times, “Oil prices, bad weather send food prices skyward”, May 6, <http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/print-edition/2011/05/06/oil-prices-weather-food-proces-skyward.html>

Along with fast-rising fuel prices, weather-induced crop shortfalls also are affecting food prices. Those in the food and restaurant industries say they haven’t seen the kind of business challenges they are now since the gas price spike and credit crisis of 2008. “I don’t think the weather instability has ever been as hostile in the last 100 years as it was in the last 12 months,” wrote Jeremy Grantham, chief investment officer of GMO Capital, an investment management firm, in a recent report. “If you were to read a one-paragraph summary of almost any agricultural commodity, you would see weather listed as one of the causes of the price rising.” The U.S. Department of AgriculturebizWatch U.S. Department of Agriculture Latest from The Business Journals Federal aid available for fire-damaged homes, communitiesHare Wynn secures 0M settlement in rice caseTwo DeKalb DFCS workers guilty of fraud Follow this company projects rising prices for a host of food commodities: Beef, up 6 percent to 8 percent; pork, up 7.5 percent. Corn prices have doubled since last year, and wheat prices remain at near record highs.

#### And, meat consumption

Damian **Carrington 11**, head environment reporter at the Guardian, “Food prices driven up by global warming, study shows”, May 5, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/may/05/food-prices-global-warming>

Food prices have reached new record highs this year, and have been implicated as a trigger for unrest in the Middle East and Africa. A rising appetite for meat is a critical factor, said Wolfram. "We actually have enough calories to feed the world quite comfortably, the problem is meat is really inefficient," as many kilogrammes of grain are needed to produce one kilogramme of meat, he said. "As countries get richer and have a preference for meat, which is more expensive, they price people in poorer countries out of the market."

#### Environment

VOA, 1/17/11

[Voice of America, “World Food Prices Expected to Stay High or Keep Rising,” <http://www.voanews.com/learningenglish/home/agriculture/Economists-Express-Concern-about-World-Food-Prices-113880179.html>]

Economists across the world are expressing concern about rising food prices. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization recently released its Food Price Index. The list showed that a number of foods cost more than during the world food crisis of two thousand eight. The index is at its highest level since it began in nineteen ninety. Demonstrations and deadly food riots have broken out this month, as they did in two thousand eight. The FAO predicts that world market prices for rice, wheat, barley, sugar and meat will stay high or continue rising. One reason for this is the threat of shortages caused by bad weather. Current and recent weather disasters have harmed agriculture and affected prices in several parts of the world. For example, the current flooding in Australia has done great damage to crops in the usually fertile Queensland area. Chickpea, wheat, sorghum and corn are among the crops affected. Floods also have harmed other vegetables and fruits. Local agricultural producers report that standing water could destroy up to half of next year’s sugar crop. And economists say prices for the fruits and vegetables could likely increase over the next six months. The effects on prices from floods last year in Pakistan and China are still being felt. Last week, Russia extended an earlier ban on wheat exports. Russia acted after heat, drought and wildfires destroyed about a third of its wheat crop last summer. The ban was placed to make sure Russians have enough wheat. The first ban caused worldwide wheat prices to climb last year by almost fifty percent.